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SOVEREIGNTY RESUMED:
CHINA's CONCEPTION OF LAw FOR HONG KONG, AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SAR AND US-PRC RELATIONS
BY
JACQUES DELISLE

A

s Hong Kong completes its first year as a Special Administrative
Region of the People's Republic of China, the territory's long tran
sition to a new relationship with China continues. The legal frame

work for the SAR, and China's conception of that framework, have played

- and still play - a central role in this process, and in shaping Hong
Kong's prospects. The Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of
Hong Kong, the Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR, and China's interpre
tation of those documents' status and meaning, were the principal foci of
legal and political controversies in the 1980s, and became the key refer
ents and touchstones for disputes over laws and institutions during the
1990s.

They may become even more prominent with the ending of

Britain's roles in the territory 's governance, the fading of China's strong
reversion-era imperative to remain in the background, and the passing of
the drama of Hong Kong's reversion-focused legal and institutional con
troversies.
China's approach to Hong Kong's reversion has implications for US
PRC relations. Narrowly, the US has largely succeeded the United King
dom as the principal external guardian of the legal promises of autonomy
and continuity for post-reversion Hong Kong, and thus made Hong Kong
an important factor in US-China relations. More broadly, China's con
ception of the arrangements for Hong Kong suggests features of China's
approaches to law and sovereignty- at home, abroad and beyond Hong
Kong- which America's China policy must address.
For China, the "Hong Kong question" has been a matter of sover
eignty - of reclaiming and delineating the authority to make laws for,
and to govern, the people and territory of Hong Kong. China has consis
tently approached this project from a perspective that is natural law-like
in its idea of sovereignty at international law and positivist in its notion of
sovereignty in the domestic realm. On this view, there are fixed principles
of what it means to be a sovereign- and, specifically, what it means to
sovereign China- as a matter of international law. These principles in
clude the Chinese sovereign's plenary authority to rule all areas and people
that are non-derogably part of an almost noumenal China- one that
includes Hong Kong. Although many international agreements are ac
ceptable from this "naturalist" perspective, any agreement that claims to
remove Hong Kong (or any other part of China) from Chinese sover
eignty, or that purports to restrict China's sovereign discretion in ruling
such territory and people, is illegitimate. It is not to be acc.epted in the
first place, and may be rejected later as a legal nullity or, at least, not nor
matively binding.
This view is amply reflected in the 1984 UK-PRC agreement that pro
vides for the transfer of authority over Hong Kong and sketches the legal
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that the Sino-British accord does not, and cannot, transfer

forcement rights) because that would be an attempt to

sovereignty over Hong Kong because Hong Kong has al

"carve up" sovereignty overHong Kong, much as the nine

ways been China's, notwithstanding the nineteenth-century

teenth-century treaties had purported to do.That the PRC

treaties purporting to cede sovereignty permanently over

would find any such arrangement unthinkable has been

Hong Kong Island and Kowloon, and to divide sovereignty

clear at least since Beijing's rebuff of the UK's initial pro

temporally over the New Territories. As Chinese leaders

posal to address the 1997 question by recognizing Chi

and negotiators stressed throughout the talks leading to the

nese sovereignty while continuing British administration,

Joint Declaration, the June 30, 1997 expiration date of the

and since Deng Xiaoping's declaration that he would not

ninety-nine-year lease on the New Territories was a date of

be another Li Hongzhang- the Qing dynasty official ir

convenience only. Because sovereignty has always resided

redeemably tainted by his role in ceding part ofHong Kong

with China, China has always been free to resume the exer

to Britain.

cise of sovereignty over all of Hong Kong earlier- or later

This PRC approach has squarely rejected a very dif

- if it judged that "conditions were ripe." This determi

ferent British perspective. The UK's conception of the

nation to avoid any appearance of accepting the nineteenth

Joint Declaration, the nineteenth-century treaties and the

century treaties' validity - and thus the need for a new

�nternational legal question of sovereignty over Hong

treaty to reconvey sovereignty- also surfaced in China's

Kong has been strongly positivist: Sovereigns are free to

insistence that the accord is not a treaty. The joint declara

make agreements addressing any number of issues, includ

tion format, China's foreign minister explained, is a "fairly

ing the reassignment of sovereignty or restrictions on its

special technique" that provides an "appropriate form" for

exercise, so long as minimal requirements of sovereign

addressing Hong Kong's return.

capacity and contract law-like formalities are satisfied·.On

Other provisions of the Joint Declaration reflect ad

this view, the nineteenth-century treaties lawfully trans

ditional aspects of China's claim to inalienable and indi

ferred sovereignty over Hong Kong Island and Kowloon

visible sovereignty over Hong Kong. Article 3 states, "The

to Britain in perpetuity and sovereignty (or at least the

Government of the People's Republic of China declares

exercise of sovereignty) over the New Territories for

that the basic policies of the People's Republic of China re

ninety-nine years. Indeed, it was the very validity of those

garding Hong Kong'' are the promises of continuity, au

treaties that created a "Hong Kong problem" because, ab

tonomy, and protection of rights outlined in the remain

sent further action, the right to exercise sovereign author

der of the article. A fuller description of those pledges is

ity over the vast bulk of the colony would revert to China

consigned to an Annex which, although declared an inte

on July 1, 1997 while Britain would remain sovereign over

gral part of the Joint Declaration, is cast as China's

the remainder - a situation that the British considered

"elaborat[ion]" of its policies toward Hong Kong, which

unworkable.A new accord of equal dignity was necessary

are to be implemented through PRC legislation.The per

and appropriate to address the problems the old treaties

spective underlying these provisions is that the declara

had created.

tions of "basic policies" are binding not as treaty-like

This British conception of the situation is formally

promises to the UK, but as self-imposed limits of the Chi

stated in article 2 of the Joint Declaration, which provides:

nese sovereign. (Indeed, they had received their initial

"The Government of the United Kingdom ...declares

public formulation before formal Sino-British negotia

that it will restore Hong Kong to the People's Republic of

tions began, in Deng Xiaoping's unilateral pronouncement

China;' effective 1 July 1997. This view that the Joint Dec

to Hong Kong's governor that "we will treat Hong Kong

laration transfers sovereignty, reversing the nineteenth

as a special region." ) The Chinese "naturalist" claim here

century cessions, was underscored in Prime Minister

is two-fold: First, because

Thatcher's initial- and

there is, and can be, no

impolitic - assertion

quo of China's regaining

that China's recognition

its undisturbed and non

of the validity of the

derogable sovereignty

original treaties was a

over Hong Kong, there is

precondition to negotia

and can be no quid in the

tions over the territory 's

PRC's statement of its

future, in the Foreign

plans for Hong Kong.

Secretary's description of

Second, the statements

the Joint Declaration as "a

about how China will ex

treaty in the most solemn

ercise sovereignty over

form," and

Hong Kong cannot im

insistence that the docu

in Britain's

pose irrevocable restric

ment be registered in the

tions (especially ones giv

United Nations treaty se

ing a foreign power en-

ries. From this positivist,

-
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contractarian perspective, the provisions setting forth the

(One notorious example is the rhetorical question Deng

PRC's basic policies regarding post-reversion Hong Kong

posed in 1984: "How can Hong Kong be described as Chi

are appropriate considerations for Britain's relinquishing

nese territory if we don't have the right to station troops

sovereignty, and the limits they impose on China are no

there?")

more problematic than the partial "unbundling" of the

China's naturalist position on the international legal

"sticks" of sovereignty that are commonplace in the Brit

issue of sovereignty over Hong Kong has also been part of

ish Commonwealth and the European Union. The UK's

a broad and coherent- if Janus-faced - vision of the

embrace of this position has been clear from a senior

"sovereign empowered:' China's international legal claim

negotiator's early comment that it was important that

to non-derogable and indivisible sovereignty over Chinese

China's promises be put in "lawyer's language:' to British

territory and people provides a principled argument for

officials' repeated and continuing declarations that Brit

shielding the sovereign's domestic actions from the risks

ain has a right to insist that Beijing fulfill the commit

of lawful treaty-like obligations. Such a position fits com

ments toward Hong Kong set forth in the Joint Declara

fortably with- indeed, seems to suggest- a claim that

tion.

the sovereign acts with plenary law-making and govern

While the PRC's naturalist views on the international
legal question of sovereignty over Hong Kong have
emerged partly in response to the UK's positivist perspec

mental authority at home, free from non-procedural con
straints and immune from substantive challenges.
This PRC view of the nature of domestic authority

tive, the PRC's arguments

over Hong Kong has been

cannot be dismissed as

positivist, and radically so.

mere negotiating tactics.
The PRC's position has
roots and resonances well
beyond the last few de
cades of the Hong Kong
question. Since well be
fore the establishment of
the People's Repu blic,
China has denounced the
treaties

ceding

Hong

Kong, and many other
agreements granting ex
traterritorial rights to for
eign powers, as "unequal
treaties" that are invalid
primarily on naturalist
gt'Ounds.

China's international /ega/ claim
to non-derogable and indivisible
sovereignty over Chinese
territory and people provides
a principled [if sel f-serving]
argu ment for shiel ding the
sovereign's domestic actions
from the risks of l awful
treaty-like obligations.

Going beyond

contract law-like notions similar to duress or unconscio

Its core claim is that laws
for any part of China are
exercises of discretionary
sovereign authority, and
are binding so long as they
satisfy formal require
ments of enactment by
authorized institutions
and according to proper
procedures. Such laws can
be altered, and institutions
restructured, by acts of the
sovereign that meet these
same tests. Within those
limits, the sovereign may
give the laws whatever
substance, and institu

tions whatever structure, it deems prudent.

nability, the long-standing Chinese indictment has as

This conception of domestic sovereignty pervades the

serted that the treaties impermissibly granted foreign pow

Basic Law - the elaborate framework legislation that

ers so much while granting China too little in return, re

spells out the structures, powers and methods for select

fused to recognize China as an equal sovereign, and tried

ing the membership for the executive, legislative and ju

to divide China's sovereignty (along territorial, temporal

dicial institutions charged with exercising the SAR's "high

and other jurisdictional lines). Moreover, the PRC has

degree of autonomy:' the substance of the pledges of con

stuck to its naturalist position on sovereignty at interna

tinuity in Hong Kong's economic, legal and social systems,

tional law even when it seems not to have been the only,

and the controversial mechanisms for amending and in

or best, way to serve its aim of recovering Hong Kong. In

terpreting the Basic Law and accepting or overturning new

1973, the PRC refused the UN Special Committee on

and preexisting Hong Kong laws. Viewed from Beijing,

Colonialism's help in claiming a right to the territory (al

the Basic Law is a mere statute, the basis of its legitimacy

beit one China might not want to exercise promptly), de

not qualitatively different from that of other positivistically

claring that Hong Kong was an internal matter "within

valid exercises of the Chinese sovereign's legislative power.

China's sovereign right" that the UN had "no right to dis

Broadly, the Basic Law is the product of a proper exercise

cuss." During the Joint Declaration negotiations and af

of the general legislative powers that the PRC's constitu

ter, Chinese leaders were willing to rattle confidence in

tion confers upon the National People's Congress, in this

Hong Kong and derail Sino-British cooperation through

case by enacting a bill prepared by a legislatively-created

statements that, at base, were demands that the PRC's

and PRC-dominated Basic Law Drafting Committee.

position on sovereignty at international law be accepted.

More narrowly, the Basic Law reflects the NPC's exercise
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the Basic Law (and to bind Hong Kong courts
with interpretation of provisions concerning
central government-SAR relations), and to
reject laws passed by the SAR legislature, or
preexisting Hong Kong laws, on the grounds
that they contravene the Basic Law.
The same perspective has characterized
the positions taken by China, and "pro-PRC"
groups in Hong Kong, in the controversies
over specific SAR laws and institutions that
have dominated Hong Kong politics during
the 1990s. After the violent suppression of
the protests at Beijing's Tiananmen Square,
Hong Kong's colonial government adopted
a Bill of Rights Ordinance that tracked the
major UN covenant and established prin
ciples of statutory construction and mecha
nisms of judicial review to ensure that Hong
Kong's laws were brought into conformity

June, 1997: Striking the Colors in the dusk of British rule.
of the authority carefully provided in an article added to
the PRC's 1982 constitution, which empowers the legislature to create special administrative regions on occasions
and with powers and privileges determined by the NPC.
During the drafting process, Chinese officials' pointed rejection of Hong Kong references to the Basic Law as a
"mini-constitution" for the region (and one that Hong
Kong's legislature might debate and reject) reflected and
underscored China's position that the Basic Law is nothing more- and nothing less - than a piece of national
PRC legislation.1
Moreover, the Basic Law implements a strongly posi
tivist vision of the Chinese sovereign's domestic author
ity with respect to Hong Kong. The general principles
section explains that the NPC authorizes- essentially as
an act of unilateral and revocable delegation -the SAR
to exercise a high degree of autonomy in governmental
affairs. The same idea runs through the Basic Law's many
institution-creating, power-conferring and rights-defin
ing articles, as well as the provisions governing the recep
tion of prior Hong Kong law and the continuity of the
legal system. Several provisions retain a vital core of dis
cretionary sovereign power in the hands of the central
authorities, avoiding the alienation of ultimate authority
that is anathema to both the domestic and international
legal dimensions of the PRC vision of the sovereign em
powered. Key sections assign to the NPC or its Standing
Committee powers to amend the Basic Law, to interpret

with the Ordinance. The PRC and its allies
denounced the Bill of Rights and related leg
islative changes with a grab-bag of positivist arguments:
The Basic Law provision authorizing continuation of the
"laws previously in force" in Hong Kong did not autho
rize the survival of radical changes wrought by the
Ordinance's substantive provisions, or the new category
of near-constitutional law created by provisions directing
courts to interpret laws to be consistent with the Ordi
nance where possible, and to rule them unlawful where
not. Moves to liberalize civil liberties-restricting legisla
tion were a British plot to undermine the power and dis
cretion of Hong Kong's government on the eve of rever
sion. The Ordinance's substantive provisions were super
fluous because, through Basic Law articles that track in
ternational human rights standards and pledge that local
laws will continue in force the requirements of the UN
covenants, China has already done all that is necessary,
and possible, to provide legal guarantees for such rights.
And moves by PRC and SAR legislative bodies to over
turn and replace objectionable provisions at the moment
of reversion were proper, lawful exercises of China's sov
ereign power.
The PRC response to Governor Patten's post
Tiananmen introduction of more democratic rules for
electing Hong Kong's last colonial legislature met with
similar responses: Broadening the so-called "functional
constituencies" so that nearly every Hong Konger with a
job could vote for a representative of his economic sector
(as well as for a representative of his geographic district)
was a move that "perfidiously disregarded" the Basic Law

1 Within the framework of the PRC's positivist legislative theory and its
naturalist perspective on the international legal status of Hong Kong,
the Basic Law's purported mechanisms of"entrenchment"- its desig
nation as a "basic law:' its nominal prohibition of amendments incon
sistent with the PRC's expressed basic policies, and its status as an
instrument implementing promises sketched in the Joint Declaration
- cannot substantially constrain China's sovereign discretion.

-24-

- "a dignified document" that was to be "strictly ob
served" and that contemplated only the narrow elector
ates of company heads, elite professionals and pro-China
unions that had comprised functional constituencies in
prior elections.

Because Patten's reforms thus contra

vened the Basic Law's requirements for electing a transi-
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tional legislature, the members of the last colonial legisla

discretion.

ture would not be appointed en masse as members of the

On these issues of domestic law and institutions for

first SAR legislature, and the "through train" was neces

the SAR, the PRC's approach has confronted a radically

sarily and lawfully derailed. The PRC-established Prepa

different view advanced by the British authorities and lib

ratory Committee could lawfully arrange the appointment

erals and "pro-democracy" groups in Hong Kong. This

of a Provisional Legislature, to take office at reversion,

latter perspective on domestic sovereignty for Hong Kong

because the Basic Law did not prohibit it, because the NPC

has been broadly natural law-like and specifically liberal

had authorized the Preparatory Committee to do every

democratic: Laws and government institutions for the

thing necessary to set up the SAR, and because the NPC's

SAR must satisfy fixed, independently discoverable norms

approval of the Preparatory Committee's final report ef

- generally ones compatible with liberalism, democracy

fectively authorized, ex post, the Committee's actions.

and the rule of law- that define the order that a sover

Post-reversion moves to adopt a narrow franchise for func

eign is obliged to secure for its subjects. Laws and institu

tional constituencies and a proportional representation

tions that fail to measure up- a category that, Hong Kong

system for geographic constituencies in the 1998legisla

democrats and independents stressed, included much of

tive elections were proper exercises of legislative author

the legislation and constitutional structure of colonial

ity that China delegated to the SAR, and reflect a permis

Hong Kong- may be sources of legal obligation, but are

sible choice among several potential arrangements com

nonetheless defective and properly denounced, even if they

patible with the Basic Law's requirements for constitut

enjoy impeccable positivist pedigrees.

ing the legislature by elections.
China and its Hong Kong allies have also made pri

On this view, the Basic Law and other laws for the
SAR have offered means to fulfill what Thatcher termed

marily positivist argu

Britain's"moral respon

ments in defending laws

sibility and duty" toward

that permitted a lower

the people of Hong

than-expected number

Kong, and to bring Hong

of foreign judges on the

Kong's illiberal and un

Court of Final Appeal

democratic colonial laws

and limited SAR courts'

into line with what many

authority to hear cases

of Hong Kong's emer

against the government

gent politicians have re

and state-controlled en

garded as requirements

tities: The arrangement

of just and proper gov

for the CPA provides for

ernance. For many of the

four permanent judges

territory's liberals and

and a list from which one

democrats, the Basic Law

temporary judge can be

is, or ought to be, a con

drawn.

This arrange

stitution for Hong Kong

ment theoretically leaves

- not merely in the

open the possibility of as

structural sense of a

many as four foreign

document that cannot be

judges (or as few as

Kunming policemen: the other system in "One Country, Two Systems."

none) on the bench, and

amended by ordinary
legislation, but also in the

is fully compatible with the Basic Law (and the Joint Dec

sense of a charter that declares and secures the liberal,

laration) provisions allowing jurists from other common

democratic and rule-of-law values that are the hallmarks

law jurisdictions to be invited"as required." Indeed, the

of legitimate rule. Thus, during the drafting process, crit

PRC has been extremely generous, and accommodating

ics attacked proposed provisions for requiring the SAR to

of Hong Kong's interests, in allowing any non-citizens to

enact laws to prohibit subversion and foreign political ties,

wield such significant sovereign authority over a part of

for commingling judicial and political authority in the

China. The exclusion of"acts of state such as foreign af

NPC Standing Committee, and for appearing to replace

fairs and defense" from the courts' jurisdiction and the

the principled and transcendent common law foundations

post-reversion extension of immunity to controversial

of Hong Kong laws with rigid and narrow positivist statu

PRC entities (such as the Xinhua News Agency, Beijing's

tory underpinnings.

principal outpost in pre-reversion Hong Kong) from cer

In the controversies of the final pre-reversion ye�s

tain Hong Kong laws (apparently including an ordinance

and the early post-reversion period, many of the argu

resembling some features of the US's freedom of infor

ments from the British and from Hong Kong's liberal and

mation act) are either technical changes incidental to re

pro-democracy politicians have continued in this broadly

version or matters unquestionably within the sovereign's

naturalist vein: The Bill of Rights was necessary to fulfill
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the sovereign's obligation to subjects whose
confidence was deeply and justifiably shaken
by the Tiananmen Incident, and to erase illib
eral laws-on-the-books that had become little
used in Hong Kong's generally liberal law-in
practice. Post-reversion roll-backs of late-co
lonial changes to civil liberties laws unaccept
ably threatened "important universal values."
Patten's reforms, rival proposals for more
sweeping democratization, the derailing of the
through train, the establishment of the Provi
sional Legislature, and the enactment of laws
governing the elections for the first SAR legis
lature are praiseworthy or condemnable to the
extent that they establish a democratic and ac
countable government, and provide institu
tional foundations for economic and political
liberties and the rule of law. Laws governing the number

fered to justify capitalist-style laws in the mainland. Fi

of foreign judges on the CFA and the jurisdiction of SAR

nally, China's positivist conception of domestic sovereignty

courts are defensible or unacceptable to the degree that

is symbiotic with its naturalist notion of sovereignty at

they provide, or fail to provide, institutions independent

international law.

and powerful enough to insure the rule of law and gov

sovereignty's external face that protects the sovereign from

ernment under law.

compromising abroad the discretion and power that posi

Although the PRC's perspective on domestic laws and

It suggests or demands a view of

tivist principles secure to the sovereign at home.

institutions for the SAR has developed partly to �ddress

Properly understood, the PRC's approach to law, sov

these British and Hong Kong liberal-democratic argu

ereignty and the Hong Kong question offers both hopeful

ments, the PRC's approach has not been simply instru

and cautionary lessons about the prospects for the SAR

mental or narrowly case-specific. The approach to law

and for US-PRC relations (in which Hong Kong is a sig

making for the PRC has been predominantly positivist,

nificant issue). First, China's notions of law and sover

especially during the post-Mao decades. In theory, legis

eignty have left room for some accords with partners or

lation may be constrained by fixed socialist principles or

antagonists who have proceeded from radically different

iron laws of economics, but China's reform-era law-mak

perspectives. Especially as the controversies in Hong Kong

ing has been driven primarily by a pragmatism and an

have turned to concrete legal and institutional questions

experimentalism that are more congenial to positivism.

(such as the composition or establishment date of the CFA,

This approach has produced numerous "draft" and "pro

or the structure of representative districts and functional

visional" laws, much legislation for trial or local imple

constituencies for legislative elections), particular visions

mentation, and massive revision or supersession of re

of sovereignty have not provided dear, determinate an

cently adopted major statutes. This perspective also has

swers. There has been considerable scope for the PRC to

regarded claims that specific laws are economically un

win support or acquiescence for outcomes it has favored,

wise or ideologically suspect as arguments for revising

and to accept - even if only for prudential reasons -

them through proper procedures, not for disregarding

some legal changes introduced in late colonial Hong Kong.

them by appealing to assertedly transcendent, extralegal

Prospects for finding additional zones of agreement seem

norms, in a manner all too evocative of the Cultural Revo

promising in SAR controversies and in Sino-American re

lution.

lations, given that increasingly important actors and align

Moreover, the PRC's insistence on positivist principles

ments in Hong Kong politics (including politically engaged

in the controversies over laws for the SAR has been so thor

business leaders and a possibly emergent populist coali

oughgoing that Beijing has often risked serious discon

tion) and the US (which is neither a party to the Joint

tent and costly uncertainty in Hong Kong to make clear

Declaration nor the territory's former colonial ruler) are,

its position that political and economic rights and judi

by temperament and experience, not deeply committed

cial and representative institutions that many Hong

to the view of law and sovereignty that the UK and Hong

Kongers value are ultimately the products of discretion

Kong's most ardent liberals and democrats embraced and

ary exercises of China's sovereign power. Strikingly ab

that the PRC has strongly opposed. Nonetheless, many

sent, for example, is any serious attempt to ground prom

apparent accords will be more fragile than they seem. Just

ises of continuity in Hong Kong's economic and social

beneath surface agreements, fault lines separate China's

systems in the non-positivist arguments (about the need

perspective on law and sovereignty over Hong Kong from

for a very long transition to socialism) that have been of-

the perspectives that hold sway among the SAR's pro-de-

-26-
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core elements of China's notion of sovereignty will be ex

mocracy politicians, who still command great popular
support in Hong Kong, and the US, which has linked US

traordinarily difficult to obtain, even with side-payments

PRC relations to matters that China considers within its

or concessions on other issues that would seem sufficient

own sovereign discretion (including Beijing's implemen

to induce compliance in a narrowly interest-based model

tation of the Joint Declaration, and human rights condi

of China's behavior.
Finally, China's adherence to the particular concep

tions in Hong Kong and elsewhere in China).
Second, the perspective that has characterized China's

tion of sovereignty reflected in its positions in the highly

arguments about sovereignty over Hong Kong_indicates

public debates over law for Hong Kong has not meant that

an additional dimension of an approach to legal and po

fidelity to a vision trumps the PRC's interests. It indicates

litical issues in the PRC's foreign relations that is highly

only that principles which are compatible with the PRC's

complex, but arguably stable, coherent and, to a degree,

overarching interests, and which usually track its imme

principled. China's handling of the Hong Kong question

diate interests, can affect perceptions of those interests at

thus suggests the need to supplement a conventional wis

the margin, and encourage behavior that does not rigidly

dom that regards China's approach to sources of interna

follow simple calculations of marginal gains or losses of

tional legal obligation as largely positivist (a position com

wealth or power. To the considerable extent that a pros

patible with China's protective, naturalist view of sover

perous and stable Hong Kong and a stable relationship

eignty at international law) and that stresses the continu

with the US are in the PRe's interest, China's conceptions

ing importance of fixed ideological or quasi-scientific prin

of sovereignty and other legal and political principles are

ciples in PRC domestic law (despite China's positivist un

unlikely to pose insurmountable barriers to cooperation,

derstanding of the laws that "ought," as a prudential and

and agreements need not unravel if they exact some sac

political matter, to align with such principles). With China's

rifices of immediate interests. But this mixing and meld

approach to the outside world and to internal affairs that

ing of interests and principles also makes for a complex

have been a concern for the US and other countries with

environment for negotiations concerning Hong Kong or

significant human rights or pro-democracy components

US-China relations. It suggests that seemingly promising

in their foreign relations laws and policies perceived in

appeals to the PRC's interests may fail and China's seem

this way, prospects seem relatively bright for proposed

ingly plausible invocations of principle sometimes will be

agreements that are crafted with a sense of which elements

disingenuous posturing or bargaining tactics that the US

in China's repertoire of ideas about law and sovereignty are

and Hong Kong liberals and democrats will want to dis

most likely to be implicated. On the other hand, attempts

count. •:•

to win China's acceptance of positions that conflict with
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